Arbitration Law in Tension After Hall Street: Accuracy of Finality? by Leasure, Stanley A.
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 
Volume 39 Issue 1 Article 3 
2016 
Arbitration Law in Tension After Hall Street: Accuracy of Finality? 
Stanley A. Leasure 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Courts Commons, and the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Stanley A. Leasure, Arbitration Law in Tension After Hall Street: Accuracy of Finality?, 39 U. ARK. LITTLE 
ROCK L. REV. 75 (2016). 
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol39/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized editor of Bowen 
Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu. 
 
 75 
ARBITRATION LAW IN TENSION AFTER HALL STREET: 
ACCURACY OR FINALITY? 
Stanley A. Leasure* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The overarching purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), enacted 
in 1925, was to ameliorate the judiciary’s long-standing hostility toward 
arbitration and to inaugurate a federal policy supporting it.1 Subsequently, 
one of the most controversial aspects of the FAA is the limited judicial re-
view available to parties seeking to vacate an arbitration award.2 The FAA 
provides four statutory grounds for vacatur involving circumstances in 
which the arbitrator engaged in misconduct or exceeded her powers, and the 
courts have created a few others, including one ground particularly pertinent 
to this discussion: manifest disregard of the law.3 
By 2008, the circuits were split on the question of whether parties to 
arbitration could agree to extend these grounds for vacatur.4 It was at that 
point when the Supreme Court of the United States resolved that circuit split 
by deciding Hall Street Associates L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.5 The Hall Street 
majority held that parties to arbitration agreements could not, by agreement, 
expand the grounds for judicial review outside those provided by the FAA.6 
However, in dictum, the Court called into question the viability of the 
longstanding common law grounds for vacatur—including manifest 
 
*Professor, Missouri State University; J.D. University of Tulsa College of Law, 1980; 
member of the Arkansas Bar Association.  
 1. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). In 
Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, the Supreme Court of the United States pro-
vided a brief overview of the history of arbitration under the FAA that will be useful in set-
ting the stage for a more careful examination of Hall Street Associates L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc. 
and its aftermath. See Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226–27 
(1987). 
 2. See Hall St. Assocs. L.L.C. v. Mattel, 552 U.S. 576, 578–80 (2008); Citigroup Glob. 
Mkt., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 352 (5th Cir. 2009); Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., 604 
F.3d 1313, 1322 (11th Cir. 2010); Campbell’s Foliage, Inc. v. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp., 562 F. 
App’x 828, 830 (11th Cir. 2014); A&G Coal Corp. v. Integrity Coal Sales, Inc., 565 F. App’x 
41, 42 (2d Cir. 2014); Renard v. Ameriprise Fin. Servs., Inc., 778 F.3d 563, 566 (7th Cir. 
2015); Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1288 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 3. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012). 
 4. See infra Part III.B. 
 5. 550 U.S. 576 (2008). 
 6. Id. at 591–92. 
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disregard of the law.7 Not surprisingly, this led to another significant circuit 
split by putting into tension the underlying premises on which arbitration 
law in the United States is based, particularly the accuracy of results (em-
phasizing greater access to judicial review) juxtaposed against finality and 
efficiency (both emphasizing more limited access to judicial review).8 
Part II of this article considers underpinnings of manifest disregard of 
the law as a ground for vacatur; the jurisprudential foundation of manifest 
disregard in the pre-Hall Street era; and finally, the responses of the circuits 
to the Hall Street dicta. Part III explicates the majority opinion and consid-
ers the manner in which the Supreme Court addressed the circuit split. Part 
IV discusses the potential risks and benefits attendant to the elimination of 
manifest disregard of the law as a common law ground for vacatur. This Part 
also argues that denying arbitral parties the right to seek judicial redress 
even in the face of the arbitrator’s manifest disregard of the law will under-
mine arbitration in the United States. 
II. HALL STREET ASSOCIATES L.L.C. V. MATTEL INC. 
The Hall Street litigation arose in connection with a real estate lease in 
which Hall Street was the lessor and Mattel the lessee.9 Under the lease, 
Mattel was required to indemnify Hall Street from claims resulting from 
water pollution on the leased premises.10 The overarching question in the 
litigation was whether Mattel was obligated to indemnify Hall Street from 
environmental claims related to the subject property.11 A preliminary and 
potentially dispositive issue in the litigation was whether Mattel had 
terminated the lease.12 If the Court determined that issue in the negative, 
then two additional issues would need to be resolved. First, whether Mattel 
failed to comply with the Oregon Drinking Water Quality Act (ODWQA), 
and second, if it did, whether the ODWQA fell within the definition of 
“applicable environmental law” contained in the lease thereby activating an 
obligation to indemnify Hall Street.13 
The first issue litigated was whether Mattel had terminated the lease.14 
The district court determined that Mattel had not terminated the lease.15 The 
 
 7. See Stanley A. Leasure, Arbitration After Hall Street v. Mattel: What Happens 
Next?, 31 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 273, 276–83 (2009). 
 8. See infra Part IV. 
 9. Hall Street, 550 U.S. at 579. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 579–80. 
 14. Id. at 579. 
 15. Hall St., 552 U.S. at 579. 
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district court also approved an agreement between Hall Street and Mattel to 
submit the two remaining issues to arbitration.16 The resulting arbitration 
agreement contained a provision expanding the availability of judicial re-
view of the arbitrator’s decision beyond the grounds outlined in the FAA.17 
Hall Street and Mattel agreed that a reviewing court would have the authori-
ty to “vacate, modify or correct any award: (i) where the arbitrator’s find-
ings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence, or (ii) where the 
arbitrator’s conclusions of law are erroneous.”18 
The arbitrator determined that the lease term “applicable environmental 
law” did not encompass the ODWQA.19 Hall Street requested review of the 
arbitral award by the district court under the terms of its arbitration agree-
ment with Mattel.20 Rejecting the arbitrator’s determination that the 
ODWQA did not fall within the scope of the lease term “applicable envi-
ronmental law,” the district court remanded the case.21 Upon remand, the 
arbitrator amended his original award to find for Hall Street following the 
district court’s legal conclusion that an “applicable environmental law” en-
compassed the ODWQA.22 
Mattel appealed, asking the Ninth Circuit to consider whether the 
grounds for vacatur are subject to expansion by agreement of the parties 
beyond those provided in 9 U.S.C. §10. The Ninth Circuit answered that 
question in the negative, vacated the judgment of the district court, and re-
manded the case to the district court with instructions to confirm the arbitral 
award unless it determined that the award is subject to vacatur or modifica-
tion under the FAA.23 On remand, the district court ruled that the arbitrator 
exceeded his powers by interpreting the lease in a manner it characterized as 
“implausible.” Another appeal ensued, and the Ninth Circuit reversed; point-
ing out that “implausibility” is not a ground for vacatur.24 The Supreme 
Court of the United States granted certiorari to decide whether the bases for 
vacatur or modification established by the FAA are exclusive.25 
The issue in Hall Street dealt with the enforceability of agreements 
providing for judicial review of arbitral decisions on grounds beyond those 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012). 
 18. Hall St., 552 U.S. at 579. 
 19. Id. at 580. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. After the entry of the amended award, both parties appealed seeking modification 
of the award, and, in response, the district court corrected the interest calculation but other-
wise upheld the amended award. Id. 
 23. Hall St. Assocs. L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 113 F. App’x. 272, 273 (2004). 
 24. Hall St. Assocs. L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 196 F. App’x. 476, 477–78 (2006). 
 25. Hall St., 552 U.S. at 578. 
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provided by the FAA.26 In a 5-4 decision, the Court declared those contrac-
tual provisions unenforceable.27 The majority yielded to what it saw as the 
textual constraint of the FAA precluding the contractual expansion of the 
grounds for vacatur.28 The impact of the decision seemed rather straightfor-
ward; resolution of a circuit split regarding the efficacy of agreements to 
expand the grounds for vacatur. However, more fundamentally, the Court 
laid bare the inherent conflict between two basic tenets of arbitration law: 
freedom to contract and finality.29 
The FAA sets out the parameters for judicial review and vacatur of an 
arbitral award, and they fall into one of two categories, arbitrator miscon-
duct or arbitrator misuse of powers.30 Federal common law has arisen in the 
context of vacatur, and those cases are not encouraging to the intrepid liti-
gant seeking to set aside an award. Litigants face a difficult path to vacatur, 
given the narrow interpretation of the statutory grounds and the deference 
afforded awards.31 
Justice Souter wrote for the Hall Street majority, Chief Justice Roberts, 
and Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, Alito, and Scalia joined in the opinion.32 
Justice Stevens penned a dissenting opinion in which Justice Kennedy 
joined.33 Justice Breyer wrote separately in dissent.34 The issue was whether 
the bases for vacatur or modification established by the FAA are subject to 
expansion or modification by agreement of the parties.35 
Hall Street first argued that manifest disregard of the law became a 
creature of the law of vacatur beginning with dictum in the Supreme Court 
decision in Wilko v. Swan.36 The language of Wilko establishes the possibil-
ity that extra-statutory grounds for vacatur arose from the Court’s discussion 
of the statutory power to vacate an arbitral award under 9 U.S.C. § 10: 
 
 26. Id. at 580. 
 27. Id. at 579. The agreement for expanded judicial review between Hall Street and 
Mattel gave a reviewing court the power to vacate, modify, or correct an award if the findings 
of fact were unsupported by substantial evidence or the conclusions of law were erroneous. 
Id. 
 28. Id. at 586. 
 29. See generally Hall St., 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
 30. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2012). 
 31. See O.R. Sec., Inc. v. Prof’l Planning Assocs., Inc., 857 F.2d 742, 746 (11th Cir. 
1988). 
 32. Hall St., 552 U.S. at 577. 
 33. Id. at 593. 
 34. Id. at 596. 
 35. Id. at 578. The burden placed on parties seeking vacatur includes the following: (i) 
clear and convincing evidence; (ii) direct nexus between defects in the process and the deci-
sion; (iii) more than mere factual or legal errors. See id. at 579. 
 36. Id. at 584–85 (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436–37 (1953)). 
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Power to vacate an award is limited. While it may be true, as the Court 
of Appeals thought, that a failure of the arbitrators to decide in accord-
ance with the provisions of the Securities Act would ‘constitute grounds 
for vacating the award pursuant to section 10 of the Federal Arbitration 
Act,’ that failure would need to be made clearly to appear. In unrestricted 
submission, such as the present margin agreements envisage, the inter-
pretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard 




With the aforementioned predicate, the following dictum from Wilko 
has been often cited to support the position that the Supreme Court of the 
United States has recognized manifest disregard of the law as an extra-
statutory ground for vacatur: “[P]ower to vacate an [arbitration] award is 
limited . . . [t]he interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to 
manifest disregard [of the law] are not subject, in the federal courts, to judi-
cial review for error in interpretation . . . .”38 
Justice Souter drew a sharp distinction between “judicial expansion by 
interpretation” and the “private expansion by contract.”39 Furthermore, the 
language relied upon rejects what Hall Street wanted, a general review for 
legal errors committed by the arbitrator.40 The majority also found the phras-
ing upon which Hall Street relied as capable of many interpretations.41 
The Hall Street Court put forth a second line of attack in support of its 
position with two discrete parts. First, Hall Street argued that arbitration 
springs from a contract sanctioned by the FAA, and second, judicial review 
for legal errors in these contracts is appropriate because the FAA is “moti-
vated, first and foremost, by a congressional desire to enforce agreements 
into which parties ha[ve] entered.”42 Justice Souter framed the second issue 
in the form of a question: “whether the FAA has textual features at odds 
with enforcing a contract to expand judicial review following the arbitra-
tion.”43 Justice Souter responded this way: 
To that particular question we think the answer is yes, that the text com-
pels a reading of §§ 10 and 11 categories as exclusive. To begin with, 
even if we assumed §§ 10 and 11 could be supplemented to some extent, 
 
 37. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436–37, overruled on different grounds by Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (citation omitted). 
 38. Hall St., 552 U.S. at 584 (citing Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436) (emphasis added). 
 39. Hall St., 552 U.S. at 585. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See id. 
 42. Id. at 585–86 (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985)) 
(alteration in original). 
 43. Hall St., 552 U.S. at 586 (emphasis added). 
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it would stretch basic interpretive principles to expand the stated grounds 
to the point of evidentiary and legal review generally.
44
 
In addition to the argument based on the concept of ejusdem generis, 
the Court found the expansion of such detailed categories of circumstances 
in which judicial review is appropriate “would rub too much against the 
grain of the § 9 language, where provision for judicial confirmation carries 
no hint of flexibility.”45 The requirement was that the court “must grant” the 
order of confirmation “unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected” 
under the provisions of sections 10 and 11.46 Such mandatory language, 
without a hint of malleability, requires the court to confirm all arbitral 
awards unless one of the “prescribed” exceptions is found applicable.47 
Rather than torture the language of the statute, Justice Souter chose to 
construe sections 9 through 11 in the policy context of a favoring arbitration 
with limited review required to maintain its efficient resolution of disputes.48 
Otherwise, he feared that arbitration would simply be another step in the 
litigation process—a result to be avoided.49 
After dispatching with each of Hall Street’s arguments, he con-
cluded with a “prediction” of what happens next: 
When all these arguments based on prior legal authority are done with, 
Hall Street and Mattel remain at odds over that happens next. Hall Street 
and its amici say parties will flee from arbitration if expanded review is 
not open to them. One of Mattel’s amici foresees flight from the court if 
it is. We do not know who, if anyone, is right, and so cannot say whether 
the exclusivity reading of the statute is more of a threat to the popularity 
of arbitrators or that of courts. But whatever the consequences of our 




According to the majority in Wilko, the Court found that section 14 of 
the Securities Act of 1933 voided agreements purporting to encompass 
alleged violations of the Act. The passage on which Hall Street focused was 
 
 44. Id. at 586. The expansion of those grounds grossly expands the grounds enumerated 
in the FAA to include general reviews of evidentiary and legal issues would be to place the 
“egregious” conduct, “corruption,” “fraud,” “evident partiality,” “misconduct,” “misbehav-
ior,” “exceed[ing] . . . powers,” “evident material miscalculation,” “evident material mis-
take,” “award[s] upon a manner not submitted” to equate those type actions with common 
ordinary mistakes of law. Id. 
 45. Id. at 587. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 588. 
 49. Hall St., 552 U.S. at 588. 
 50. Id. at 588–89 (citation omitted). 
2016] ARBITRATION LAW 81 
nothing more than an explanation that arbitration would undermine the 
protection afforded buyers by the Securities Act given the limited vacatur 
powers available under the FAA and the fact that appellate review of 
interpretations of the law by arbitrators is not available—as compared to 
manifest disregard of the law.51 
Justice Souter conceded that Hall Street’s interpretation of this passage 
as legitimizing manifest disregard of the law as an additional extra-statutory 
ground for vacatur is in accord with some of the circuits.52 Nevertheless, he 
redirected the examination to the ability of parties to arbitration to contract 
for expanded judicial review and the question of the availability of “general 
review for an arbitrator’s legal errors”: 
Hall Street sees this supposed addition to § 10 as the camel’s nose: if 
judges can add grounds to vacate . . . so can contracting parties. 
. . . . 
But this is too much for Wilko to bear. Quite apart from its leap from a 
supposed judicial expansion by interpretation to a private expansion by 
contract, Hall Street overlooks the fact that the statement it relies on ex-




He then launched into a series of “maybes” about possible meanings of the 
manifest disregard language in Wilko: 
Then there is the vagueness of Wilko’s phrasing. Maybe the term “mani-
fest disregard” was meant to name a new ground for review, but maybe it 
merely referred to the § 10 grounds collectively, rather than adding to 
them. Or, as some courts have thought, “manifest disregard” may have 
been shorthand for § 10(a)(3) or § 10(a)(4), the paragraphs authorizing 
vacatur when the arbitrators were “guilty of misconduct” or “exceeded 
their powers.” We, when speaking as a Court, have merely taken 
the Wilko language as we found it, without embellishment, and now that 
its meaning is implicated, we see no reason to accord it the significance 
that Hall Street urges.
54
 
Determining the question of whether the parties could contractually 
expand the grounds for judicial review of arbitral decisions was the thrust of 
 
 51. Id. at 584. 
 52. Id. at 584–85 (citing McCarthy v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., 463 F.3d 87, 91 (1st 
Cir. 2006); Hoeft v. MVL Grp., Inc., 343 F.3d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 2003); Prestige Ford v. Ford 
Dealer Comput. Servs. Inc., 324 F.3d 391, 395–96 (5th Cir. 2003); Scott v. Prudential Sec., 
Inc., 141 F.3d 1007, 1017 (11th Cir. 1998)). 
 53. Hall St., 552 U.S. at 585. 
 54. See id. at 585 (citations omitted). 
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the dispute between Hall Street and Mattel and the reason for granting certi-
orari. It was not whether the jurisprudence leading up to the common law 
grounds for vacatur are valid and much of the majority opinion is dictum. 
Among the best examples are the following: 
On application for an order confirming the arbitration award, the court 
“must grant” the order “unless the award is vacated, modified, or cor-
rected as prescribed in Sections 10 and 11 of this title.” There is nothing 
malleable about “must grant,” which unequivocally tells courts to grant 
confirmation in all cases, except when one of the “prescribed” excep-
tions applies. This does not sound remotely like a provision meant to tell 
a court what to do just in case the parties say nothing else.
55
 
Adding to the confusion, the majority suggested that: 
In holding that §§ 10 and 11 provide exclusive regimes for the review 
provided by the statute, we do not purport to say that they exclude more 
searching review based on authority outside the statute as well. The FAA 




The status of the common law grounds for vacatur—particularly mani-
fest disregard of the law—was not only left unanswered by Hall Street, but 
also rendered more confused than before. The statutory grounds for vacatur 
under the FAA have been supplemented by judicially crafted grounds in 
each of the circuits, including manifest disregard of the law. Because mani-
fest disregard falls outside the FAA’s statutory framework, its continued 
viability has been called into question by Hall Street and the majority con-
ceded that it could not predict the practical effect of this ruling.57 
III. MANIFEST DISREGARD OF THE LAW AS A GROUND FOR VACATUR 
A.  Statutory Vacatur Under the FAA 
The majority in Hall Street placed significant, if not primary, emphasis 
on the textual language of the confirmation and vacatur provisions of the 
FAA in reaching its decision.58 For purposes of this preliminary discussion, 
several points are important and will be discussed briefly. 
First, the FAA requires judicial confirmation of arbitral awards in cer-
tain circumstances.59 The FAA provisions for confirmation of arbitral 
 
 55. Id. at 587. 
 56. Id. at 590. 
 57. Id. at 589. 
 58. Leasure, supra note 7, at 276–83. 
 59. See 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2012). 
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awards are found at 9 U.S.C. § 9, and provide that upon the request of a 
party the district court must confirm the award unless it is vacated, 
modified, or corrected pursuant to 9 U.S.C. §§ 10 and 11.60 
The section of the FAA receiving the most scrutiny in the Hall Street 
opinion was, without a doubt, the statutory vacatur provisions found in 9 
U.S.C. § 10.61 It is important to note that in Hall Street, as well as its proge-
ny, the pole star of this section is the strict, narrow, and technical manner in 
which the courts have construed it.62 Described generally, the section 10 
grounds for vacatur are established upon showing one of the following: the 
award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; evident partiality 
or corruption of the arbitrator; and arbitrator misconduct or when the 
arbitrator exceeded his powers or imperfectly executed them.63 
B.  The Nature of the Manifest Disregard Circuit Split Before Hall Street 
The starting point for any discussion of manifest disregard of the law as 
a common law basis for vacatur begins with dictum from Wilko.64 It is im-
portant to note just how widespread manifest disregard of the law became in 
the wake of the 1953 Wilko decision. Subsequent to Wilko, manifest disre-
gard of the law as a ground for vacatur had been adopted in some form or 
another in all the circuits.65 The following dictum in the Wilko opinion has 
served as the source of almost all of the modern case law establishing 
manifest disregard of the law as a common law basis for vacatur: “In unre-
stricted submission, such as the present margin agreements envisage, the 
interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard 
 
 60. 9 U.S.C.§§ 10, 11 (2012). 
 61. Under 9 U.S.C. § 10 arbitral awards are subject to vacatur on the following grounds 
related to the conduct by the arbitrator(s): corruption, fraud, or undue means; partiality or 
corruption; refusing to postpone, or to hear evidence, or other misbehavior; and exceed-
ed/imperfectly executed powers. Id. For a detailed discussion of the statutory underpinnings 
of Hall Street v. Mattel found in sections 9, 10, and 11 of the FAA, see Leasure, supra note 7, 
at 276–83. 
 62. See Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C., 300 F. App’x 415, 418 (6th Cir. 2008); 
Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1288 (9th Cir. 2009); Stolt-Nielsen 
S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 90–91 (2d Cir. 2008); Citigroup Glob. Mkts., 
Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 351–54 (5th Cir. 2009); Med. Shoppe Int’l, Inc. v. Turner Invs., 
Inc., 614 F.3d 485, 488 (8th Cir. 2010); Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., 604 F.3d 1313, 1321 
(11th Cir. 2010); Wachovia Sec., LLC v. Brand, 671 F.3d 472, 478 (4th Cir. 2012); Bel-
lantuono v. ICAP USA, LLC, 557 F. App’x 168, 173 (3d Cir. 2014); Renard v. Ameriprise 
Fin. Servs., Inc., 778 F.3d 563, 567 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 63. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012). 
 64. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436–37 (1953) overruled on different grounds by 
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
 65. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Codifying Manifest Disregard, 8 NEV. L.J. 234, 235 
n.11 (2007) (citing Birmingham News Co. v. Horn, 901 So.2d 27, 48–49 (2004)). 
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are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpre-
tation.”66 
Litigants attempting to bolster the efficacy of the Wilko dictum now 
have a more recent case upon which to rely. In 1995, the Supreme Court 
decided a case involving an arbitration dispute, First Options of Chicago v. 
Kaplan.67 In Kaplan, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the viability of the dic-
tum in Wilko that since 1953 has been relied upon as the Supreme Court’s 
imprimatur on manifest disregard of the law as a common law ground for 
vacatur. In addressing the scope of judicial review of an arbitrator’s deci-
sion, the Supreme Court cited the oft-quoted dictum from Wilko recognizing 
a common law right to judicial review of arbitration decisions in manifest 
disregard of the law.68 
C.  The Nature of the Manifest Disregard Circuit Split After Hall Street 
Hall Street v. Mattel came to the Supreme Court of the United States to 
resolve a deepening circuit split over the question of whether parties to an 
arbitration agreement could expand, by agreement, the grounds for judicial 
review beyond those in section 10 of the FAA.69 The Supreme Court an-
swered that question in the negative, but as a result of the majority’s dicta, 
the Court created another split, that being whether the manifest disregard of 
the law confusion caused by Wilko survived.70 Justice Souter’s discussion on 
that particular point appears to have created more questions than it an-
swered.71 As mentioned above, Hall Street resolved one circuit split and, at 
the same time, created another one with the potential for even more disrup-
tion to the law of arbitration than already existed. As discussed below, the 
Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that manifest disregard of the 
law is not a viable basis for vacatur post-Hall Street.72 Conversely, the Sec-
ond, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits continue to allow submis-
 
 66. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436–37 (emphasis added); accord McCarthy v. Citigroup Glob. 
Mkts., 463 F.3d 87, 91 (1st Cir. 2006); Hoeft v. MVL Grp., Inc., 343 F.3d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 
2003); Prestige Ford v. Ford Dealer Comput. Servs., Inc., 324 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2003); 
Scott v. Prudential Sec., Inc. 141 F.3d 1007, 1017 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 67. 514 U.S. 938 (1995). 
 68. Id. at 942. In Kaplan, the Supreme Court discussed the limited scope of judicial 
review of arbitration decisions in some detail: “The party still can ask a court to review the 
arbitrator’s decision, but the court will set that decision aside only in very unusual circum-
stances.” Id. 
 69. Hall St. Assocs. L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 583 n.5 (2008). 
 70. Id. at 584–85 (quoting Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436–37). 
 71. Matthew J. Brown, “Final” Awards Reconceptualized: A Proposal to Resolve the 
Hall Street Circuit Split, 13 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L. J. 325, 340 (2013). 
 72. See infra Part III.C.1. 
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sion of manifest disregard as a basis for vacatur.73 That leaves the First, 
Third, and Sixth Circuits as the outliers that have yet to definitively answer 
the question of whether manifest disregard continues as an extra-statutory 
ground for vacatur.74 
1. Circuits Rejecting Manifest Disregard  
Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Bacon involved unauthorized 
withdrawals from Bacon’s individual retirement account by Citigroup.75 The 
arbitral panel concluded that Citigroup was required to reimburse Bacon for 
the unauthorized withdrawals.76 The district court vacated the arbitrators’ 
award, and Bacon appealed to the Fifth Circuit.77 The Fifth Circuit charac-
terized the issue before it as “whether manifest disregard of the law remains 
a valid ground for vacatur of an arbitration award in light of the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Hall Street. . . .”78 The court answered that ques-
tion in the negative, rejecting the notion that the Wilko v. Swan dictum gives 
rise to manifest disregard as an extra-statutory ground for vacatur.79 
With that as its predicate, the Fifth Circuit presented a detailed history 
of the law of vacatur from the mid-19th century to the present.80 Before the 
adoption of the United States Arbitration Act in 1925, arbitration decisions 
were subject to being vacated only in the presence of a few narrow circum-
stances subject to very limited review.81 The Fifth Circuit characterized 
 
 73. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 74. See infra Part III.C.3. 
 75. 562 F.3d 349, 350 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 350, 354–55 (“We conclude that Hall Street restricts the grounds for vacatur to 
those set forth in §10 of the Federal Arbitration Act . . . 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., and consequent-
ly, manifest disregard of the law is no longer an independent ground for vacating arbitration 
awards under the FAA. Hall Street effectively overrules our previous authority to the contra-
ry.”); see also McVay v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 608 F. App’x 222, 225 (5th Cir. 
2015). In Bacon, the Fifth Circuit went on to discuss how the various lower courts that have 
considered and attempted to apply the concept of manifest disregard as a ground for vacatur, 
have “grappled with the uncertain implications” of the clause in question in Wilko. Citigroup 
Glob. Mkts., Inc., v. Bacon, 562 F.3d at 354 (citing O.R. Sec., Inc. v. Prof’l Planning As-
socs., Inc., 857 F.2d 742, 746–47 (11th Cir. 1988)); Nat’ l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Chesa-
peake & Ohio Ry. Co., 551 F.2d 136, 143 n.9 (7th Cir. 1977) (“We share the reservations 
recently expressed by the Second Circuit as to whether the Wilko dictum was actually intend-
ed to add ‘manifest disregard’ of the law to the statutory grounds for vacating an award in 9 
U.S.C. [§]10.”). 
 80. Bacon, 562 F.3d at 350–51. 
 81. Id. at 351 (citing Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344, 349–51 (1854)); see 
also Karthaus v. Ferrer, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 222, 228 (1828). Deference was due to the arbitral 
decision. Courts of equity were not to set aside arbitral awards for error as long as: (1) the 
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these common law vacatur rules as closely akin to the provisions of section 
10 of the FAA.82 By enacting the FAA, Congress evidenced its concurrence 
with those common law precedents, and arbitration awards usually survive 
judicial review under the concepts espoused in the FAA.83 The Bacon Court 
quoted with approval the following from the Hall Street opinion: 
[P]ermitting vacatur and modification of arbitration awards on more ex-
pansive grounds “opens the door to the full-bore legal and evidentiary 
appeals that can rende[r] informal arbitration merely a prelude to a more 
cumbersome and time-consuming judicial review process, and bring ar-
bitration theory to grief in post-arbitration process.”
84
 
Accordingly, enactment of the FAA evidenced its concurrence with the 
state of the common law at that time with the result that, consistent with the 
previously existing common law, arbitration awards are to be generally 
upheld under the principles espoused in the FAA.85 However, the standard 
for establishing manifest disregard was stringent, involving more than an 
error or misunderstanding of the law. It required showing that the error was 
obvious and capable of being easily identified by the arbitrator and that the 
arbitrator appreciated the existence of a governing principle but decided to 
ignore it.86 Further, establishing manifest disregard of the law required a 
showing it resulted in a significant injustice.87 
In McVay v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., the Fifth Circuit was 
faced with a dispute between an employer and its former employee on the 
use of intellectual property by the employee after leaving his employment.88 
Based on an intellectual property agreement between the parties, the arbitra-
tor entered an award enjoining McVay from using Halliburton’s intellectual 
property and awarding the company money damages, attorney’s fees, and 
 
award was in the arbitral submissions; (2) it contained the honest decision of the arbitrators; 
and (3) a full and fair hearing was held. Id. (citing Burchell, 58 U.S. (17 How.) at 349). Vaca-
tur was appropriate only in the face of (1) fraud, corruption, or improper conduct on the part 
of the arbitrator; (2) failure of the arbitrators to decide all of the issues submitted; (3) circum-
stances in which the arbitrators exceeded their powers by deciding non-submitted issues; and 
(4) if the award was not certain, final, and mutual. Id. (citing Burchell, 58 U.S. (17 How.) at 
351; Carnochan v. Christie, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 446, 460–67 (1826)). 
 82. Bacon, 562 F.3d at 351. 
 83. Id. at 351–52. 
 84. Id. at 351 (citation omitted). 
 85. Id. at 351–54. 
 86. Id. at 354 (quoting Prestige Ford v. Ford Dealer Computer Servs., Inc., 324 F.3d 
391, 395 (2013) (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 
933–34 (2d Cir. 1986))). 
 87. Bacon, 562 F.3d at 354 (quoting Kerogosien v. Ocean Energy, Inc., 390 F.3d 346, 
355 (5th Cir. 2004)). 
 88. McVay v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 608 F. App’x 222, 224 (5th Cir. 2015). 
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costs.89 The district court affirmed the award.90 McVay appealed, contending 
that the arbitrator entered an indefinite award and therefore had imperfectly 
executed her powers.91 In response to this argument, Halliburton argued that 
McVay had waived this ground for challenge “by basing it on the repudiated 
‘manifest disregard’ standard.”92 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision of 
the district court, declaring that the standard of review for arbitral awards is 
both deferential and narrow, reviewing factual findings for clear error and 
legal conclusions de novo.93 
In Medicine Shoppe, International, Inc. v. Turner Investments, Inc., the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit confirmed its 
understanding that Hall Street’s practical effect was to establish the grounds 
specifically enumerated in the FAA as the exclusive grounds for vacatur.94 
As in most of the post-Hall Street cases, the court began by describing the 
standard of appellate review of arbitral decisions as quite deferential; that 
being that questions of law are reviewed de novo, and findings of fact exam-
ined under a clearly erroneous standard.95 Finally, the reviewing court’s au-
thority to vacate an arbitration award at all is limited to the circumstances 
set out in the provisions of 9 U.S.C. §§ 9 through 11.96 The Eighth Circuit 
 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 223–24. 
 91. Id. at 225. Under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) vacatur is appropriate where the arbitrator 
“exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite 
award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.” 
 92. McVay, 608 F. App’x at 225 (citing Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 
349 (5th Cir. 2009)). In Bacon, the Fifth Circuit said: 
The question before us now is whether, under the FAA, manifest disregard of the law remains 
valid, as an independent ground for vacatur, after Hall Street. The answer seems clear. Hall 
Street unequivocally held that the statutory grounds are the exclusive means for vacatur under 
the FAA. Our case law defines manifest disregard of the law as a nonstatutory ground for 
vacatur. Thus, to the extent that manifest disregard of the law constitutes a non-statutory 
ground for vacatur, it is no longer a basis for vacating awards under the FAA. 
562 F.3d at 355 (citation omitted). 
 93. McVay, 608 F. App’x at 224–25, 227. 
 94. Med. Shoppe Int’l, Inc. v. Turner Invs., Inc., 614 F.3d 485, 489 (8th Cir. 2010). This 
case involved a dispute between parties to a franchise agreement in which the arbitrator en-
tered an award in favor of Medicine Shoppe for lost profits and future license fees, which was 
confirmed by the district court. Id. at 487–88. On appeal, Turner Investments argued that the 
arbitrator entered the award in manifest disregard of the law. Id. at 488. 
 95. Id. at 488 (quoting McGrann v. First Albany Corp., 424 F.3d 743, 748 (8th Cir. 
2005)). As the Medicine Shoppe court noted, “The bottom line is we will confirm the arbitra-
tor’s award even if we are convinced that the arbitrator committed serious error, so long as 
the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope 
of his authority.” Id. (quoting McGrann, 424 F.3d at 748). 
 96. Med. Shoppe, 614 F.3d at 488 (citing Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 
U.S. 576, 582 (2008)). The court took care to point out that those four grounds set forth in 
section 10 of the FAA permit vacatur of an arbitration award only in the presence of: 
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recognized that, before Hall Street, the grounds for vacatur were broader 
than those set forth in 9 U.S.C. § 10 to include, among others, awards evi-
dencing a manifest disregard for the law. In the view of the Eighth Circuit, 
these extra-statutory grounds did not survive the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Hall Street.97 
Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp.98 was decided by the Eleventh Circuit. 
The parties submitted a mortgage dispute to arbitration. The arbitrator grant-
ed CitiFinancial monetary damages and certain equitable relief. Frazier 
asked the district court to vacate the award because, inter alia, it was in 
manifest disregard of the law.99 This contention required the court to consid-
er whether, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Hall Street, manifest dis-
regard was still viable.100 The Eleventh Circuit quickly laid that question to 
rest: 
Having determined that the award was not subject to vacatur and/or 
modification under sections 10 or 11, we turn to Mrs. Fraser’s additional 
arguments that the award was arbitrary and capricious, in violation of 
public policy, and made in manifest disregard for the law. Although our 
prior precedents have recognized these three non-statutory grounds for 
vacatur, Hall Street casts serious doubt on their legitimacy.
101
 
The majority in Hall Street found that a reviewing court “must grant” 
application for an order of confirmation unless it is subject to vacatur, 
modification, or correction under the provisions of sections 10 and 11.102 
 
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where there was 
evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators 
were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, 
or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy, or any other misbe-
havior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators 
exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite 
award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. 
Med. Shoppe, 614 F.3d at 488–89. The court also noted that it had previously recognized the 
effect of Hall Street vis-à-vis manifest disregard of the law leaving only the grounds specified 
in the FAA. Id. at 489 (citing Crawford Group, Inc. v. Holekamp, 543 F.3d 971, 976 (8th Cir. 
2008)). 
 97. Med. Shoppe, 614 F.3d at 489. 
 98. 604 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 99. Id. at 1320–22. Frazier also sought (1) vacatur of the award because the arbitrator 
exceeded his powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award 
upon the subject matter was not made (9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4)); and (2) modification or correc-
tion of the award because the arbitrator entered it in a matter not submitted to him (9 U.S.C. § 
11(b)) and it was imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy (9 
U.S.C. § 11(c)); Frazier asked the court to vacate the award on the common law grounds that 
the award was arbitrary and capricious and in violation of public policy. Id. 
 100. Id. at 1314 (citing Hall St., 552 U.S. 576). 
 101. Frazier, 604 F.3d at 1322. 
 102. Hall St., 552 U.S. at 587. 
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The Eleventh Circuit found the language “must grant” to be an unequivocal 
mandate unless one of the statutory exceptions is applicable, “there is noth-
ing malleable about ‘must grant,’ which unequivocally tells courts to grant 
confirmation in all cases, except when one of the ‘prescribed’ exceptions 
applies.”103 The court then turned to the question of whether one of the statu-
tory bases for vacatur was applicable in this case and concluded that none 
were, “[w]e think it clear that none of the statutory bases for vacating an 
arbitrator’s award under the FAA applies in this case.”104 
The court presented an extensive review of the issues touching vacatur 
in the wake of Hall Street, including the standard of review,105 grounds for 
vacatur under the FAA,106 and common law grounds for vacatur of arbitra-
tion awards.107 Recognizing that the Supreme Court did not “explicitly ex-
tend its holding in Hall Street to judicial expansions of §§ 10 and 11,” the 
Frazier court recited the varying treatment to which these non-statutory 
grounds for vacatur have received in the circuits.108 After reviewing this 
judicial history and considering the manner in which the Hall Street majori-
ty addressed non-statutory grounds, the court held that the common law 
grounds for vacatur were precluded by the Hall Street decision.109 
In Campbell’s Foliage, Inc. v. Federal Crop Insurance Corp., the 
Eleventh Circuit confirmed that the only viable grounds for vacatur in that 
circuit were those enumerated in the FAA.110 The dispute surrounded a deni-
al of coverage under a crop insurance policy issued by the Federal Crop 
Insurance Corporation to Campbell’s. Subsequently, the arbitrator con-
firmed the denial of coverage, and Campbell’s sought vacatur of the award 
 
 103. Frazier, 604 F.3d at 1322. 
 104. Id. at 1321. In addition, the court rejected Frazier’s contentions that she was entitled 
to modification or correction of the arbitral award because it was entered upon a matter not 
submitted to the arbitrator (9 U.S.C. § 11(b)) and that it was imperfect in matter of form not 
affecting the merits of the controversy (9 U.S.C. § 11(c)). Id. at 1321–22. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 1322–23. 
 107. Id. at 1322–24. In addition to the aforementioned statutory grounds for vacatur, prior 
to Hall Street, the Eleventh Circuit had upheld vacatur of arbitral awards under circumstances 
in which the arbitral awards were arbitrary and capricious, in violation of public policy, and 
made in manifest disregard for the law. Id. at 1322. 
 108. Frazier, 604 F.3d at 1323 (citing Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349 
(5th Cir. 2009)); see also Ramos-Santiago v. UPS, 524 F.3d 120, 124–25 (1st Cir. 2008); 
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010); see generally Comedy 
Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 109. Frazier, 604 F.3d at 1324. The Eleventh Circuit minced no words in striking down 
manifest disregard of the law and its other common law bases for vacatur, “[w]e hold that our 
judicially-created bases for vacatur are no longer valid in light of Hall Street. In so holding, 
we agree with the Fifth Circuit that the categorical language of Hall Street compels such a 
conclusion.” Id. 
 110. Campbell’s Foliage, Inc. v. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp., 562 F. App’x 828, 831 (11th Cir. 
2014). 
90 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
in the district court.111 Campbell’s conceded that none of the bases for vaca-
tur set forth in 9 U.S.C. § 10 were present. The district court interpreted the 
judicial review mentioned in the subject insurance policy as contemplating 
the limited review provided in section 10 of the FAA.112 On appeal, Camp-
bell’s asserted that (1) the district court should have interpreted the policy 
provision more expansively, and (2) the grounds for vacatur provided in the 
FAA were not the only available bases for vacatur.113 
The court reiterated its acknowledgment in Frazier that the Hall Street 
decision invalidated the “‘judicially-created bases for vacatur’ we had for-
merly recognized, such as where an arbitrator behaved in manifest disregard 
of the law . . . .”114 The court also rejected Campbell’s argument that the 
policy’s arbitration provisions fell within the Hall Street “carve-outs” 
regarding a “more searching review based on authority outside the statute” 
and that “[t]he FAA is not the only way into court for parties wanting 
review of arbitration awards.”115 
2. Circuits Affirming Manifest Disregard 
The Second, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have continued 
to allow submission of manifest disregard as a basis for vacatur after Hall 
Street. Representative cases from these circuits are examined in this section. 
Soon after the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Hall Street, 
the Second Circuit, in Stolt-Nielson SA v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., 
considered the continued viability of manifest disregard as a ground for va-
catur.116 An arbitral panel had concluded that the arbitration clause in the 
parties’ contract allowed for class arbitration.117 The United States District 
 
 111. Id. at 829–30. The policy provision relied on by Campbell’s provided: “Any deci-
sion rendered in arbitration is binding on you and us unless judicial review is sought . . . 
Notwithstanding any provision in the rules of [the American Arbitration Association], you 
and we have the right to judicial review of any decision rendered in arbitration.” Id. at 830. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 831 (citing Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., 604 F.3d 1313, 1324 (11th Cir. 
2010)). 
 115. Campbell’s Foliage, Inc., 562 F. App’x at 832. 
 116. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008). In Stolt-
Nielson, the dispute that led to arbitration consisted of an anti-trust dispute brought by Ani-
malFeeds against Stolt-Nielson founded on allegations that Stolt-Nielson engaged in price 
fixing vis-à-vis a class of purchasers of parcel tank or transportation services. Id. at 87–88. 
 117. Id. at 89. The basis for the panel’s conclusion regarding class arbitration was: (1) the 
arbitration clause and the parties’ contract allowed for class arbitration; and New York law 
had no prohibition of class arbitration. Id. at 89–90. 
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Court for the Southern District of New York determined that the panel made 
the award in manifest disregard of the law.118 
At the outset, the Second Circuit considered the manifest disregard 
claim of Stolt-Nielson in light of Hall Street.119 Analyzing the process of 
vacatur as one part of an overall arbitral process, the Second Circuit focused 
first on the intent of the parties and their agreement to submit their dispute 
to arbitration as opposed to entering the judicial system, most commonly for 
reasons of efficiency, reduction in cost, and control over the process.120 The 
court reiterated the elements of manifest disregard in the Second Circuit: 
presence of a clear law explicitly applicable to the subject of the arbitration, 
improperly applied and leading to an erroneous outcome, and the arbitrator’s 
knowledge of the existence of the law and its applicability to the subject of 
the dispute.121 
Next, the court considered the status of manifest disregard in the wake 
of Hall Street. In the wake of Hall Street, the Second Circuit sustained its 
logic with the “judicial gloss” approach to manifest disregard.122 The linch-
pin of the “judicial gloss” construction is that a challenge to an arbitral 
award is not that the arbitrator erred but that the arbitrator violated the arbi-
tration agreement by engaging in one or more of the acts described in sec-
tion 10 of the FAA and to which the parties did not consent to in the agree-
ment to arbitrate.123 The question is whether the arbitrator exceeded the au-
thority granted in the arbitral agreement.124 In attaching itself to this argu-
ment, the Seventh Circuit declared the judicial gloss approach to be both 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hall Street and its own view 
of manifest disregard in the pre-Hall Street era.125  
With this as a rubric against which to consider the claim of manifest 
disregard, the Second Circuit reversed, determining that Stolt-Nielson failed 
 
 118. Id. at 90. The basis for this conclusion was that the arbitrators should have conduct-
ed a choice of law analysis that would have led to the conclusion that federal maritime law 
requires contracts to be interpreted in light of custom and usage. Id. (citing Stolt-Nielsen S.A. 
v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., 435 F. Supp. 2d 382, 385–86 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)). 
 119. Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 93–94 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 120. Id. at 91–92. (citing Porzig v. Dresdner, Kleinwort, Benson, N. Am. LLC, 497 F.3d 
133, 138–39 (2d Cir. 2007); Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Standard Microsystems 
Corp., 103 F.3d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1997); Note, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards on the 
Merits, 63 HARV. L. REV. 681, 681–82 (1950)). 
 121. Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 93. 
 122. Id. at 94. 
 123. Wise v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, 450 F.3d 265, 269 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 94. To bolster its pre-Hall Street consistency argument, 
the court noted that it had characterized its manifest disregard review as “‘severely limited,’ 
‘highly deferential,’ and confined to ‘those exceedingly rare instances’ of ‘egregious impro-
priety on the part of the arbitrators.’” Id. (citing Duferco Int’l Steel Trading v. T. Klaveness 
Shipping A/S, 333 F.3d 383, 389 (2003)). 
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to cite legal authority applying custom and usage precluding class 
arbitration.126 Accordingly, the arbitration panel had not manifestly 
disregarded New York law which had no such established rule against class 
arbitration.127 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether imposing class 
arbitration on parties whose contracts fail to address the issue comports with 
the provisions of the FAA.128 In addition to the class arbitration issue, the 
Court also considered whether manifest disregard survived Hall Street.129 
As described by Justice Alito writing for the majority, the petitioners 
had the burden to “clear a high hurdle” to sustain their burden to establish 
grounds for vacatur of the arbitration award.130 This burden, according to the 
majority, can only be satisfied in circumstances where the arbitrator “strays 
from interpretation and application of the agreement and effectively 
‘dispense[s] his own brand of industrial justice’ to the extent that his 
decision may be unenforceable.”131 In these circumstances, the statutory 
basis for such vacatur would be section 10(a)(4) of the FAA under the mon-
iker that the arbitrator had “exceeded his powers.”132 Here, the majority con-
cluded that the arbitration panel had exceeded its powers in issuing its award 
to such an extent that it was tantamount to imposing on the party its “own 
view of sound policy regarding class arbitration.”133 
In A&G Coal Corporation v. Integrity Coal Sales, Inc., the Second 
Circuit ruled that manifest disregard of the law continues as a viable com-
mon law ground for vacatur but, that in this case, it was not established by 
the proof.134 The Second Circuit, relying on its holding in Schwartz v. Mer-
rill Lynch & Co., reiterated: “As ‘judicial gloss’ on these specific grounds 
 
 126. Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 96. 
 127. Id. at 96–97. 
 128. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 666 (2010). 
 129. Id. at 670. With respect to the manifest disregard issue, the Second Circuit conclud-
ed that that common law ground for vacatur did survive Hall Street as “judicial gloss” on the 
enumerated grounds for vacatur set forth in 9 U.S.C. § 10. Id. For purposes of this case, the 
Second Circuit determined that the arbitration panel’s decision was not in manifest disregard 
of federal maritime law because the petitioners had failed to cite authority applying a mari-
time rule of custom and usage against class arbitration. Id. 
 130. Id. at 671 (citing E. Assoc. Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57 (2000); Pa-
perworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987)). 
 131. Stolt-Nielson, 559 U.S. at 671–72. (citing Major League Baseball Players Assn. v. 
Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001) (per curiam); (quoting Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car 
Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960))). 
 132. Stolt-Nielson, 559 U.S. at 672. The Court identified the function of the arbitrator in 
such circumstances is “to interpret and enforce a contract, not to make public policy.” Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. A&G Coal Corp. v. Integrity Coal Sales, Inc., 565 F. App’x 41, 42–43 (2d Cir. 
2014). 
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for vacatur, this court has held that an arbitration award may be set aside if it 
was rendered in ‘manifest disregard of the law.’”135 
The court found that the party seeking vacatur must establish that: (1) 
“the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitrators was well 
defined, explicit, and clearly applicable” and (2) “the arbitrator knew about 
the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it 
or pay no attention to it.”136 Also, as the court noted, an arbitral award is 
subject to vacatur if in “manifest disregard of the terms of the parties’ rele-
vant agreement.”137 Using these principles, the Second Circuit concluded 
that the proof in the case was lacking, and the challenge to the award on the 
basis of manifest disregard must fail.138 
In Dewan v. Walia, the Fourth Circuit held that the arbitral award was 
subject to vacatur on the grounds of manifest disregard of the law.139 The 
dispute involved an alleged breach of a non-competition provision in an 
employment contract between Dewan, a CPA firm, and one of its employ-
ees, Walia.140 Upon referral to arbitration, the arbitrator entered a money 
damages award in Walia’s favor.141 The district court confirmed the award 
and granted Walia his attorney’s fees and costs.142 Dewan appealed, con-
tending that the award was the result of the arbitrator’s manifest disregard of 
the law. The Fourth Circuit agreed and remanded the case to the district 
court with instructions to vacate the arbitral award.143 The Fourth Circuit 
conducted the review of factual findings for clear error and conclusions of 
law de novo.144 The controlling law, according to the Fourth Circuit, was not 
that relied upon by the parties and the court below (the Maryland Uniform 
Arbitration Act), but rather, the FAA.145 Dealing with the merits of the case, 
 
 135. Id. at 42 (citing Schwartz v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 665 F.3d 444, 451 (2d Cir. 2011)). 
 136. A&G Coal Corp., 665 F.3d at 42 (quoting Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 646 F.3d 
113, 121 n.1 (2d Cir. 2011)). 
 137. A&G Coal Corp., 665 F.3d at 42 (quoting Schwartz, 65 F.3d at 451). 
 138. A&G Coal Corp., 665 F.3d at 43. 
 139. 544 F. App’x 240, 245 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 140. Id. at 241. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 244 (quoting Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Bishop, 596 F.3d 183, 190 
(4th Cir. 2010)). 
 145. Dewan, 544 F. App’x at 244 (quoting Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 349 (2008)). 
The basis for this conclusion was the jurisdictional provisions of the FAA: “Under § 2 of the 
FAA, ‘[a] written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to 
settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . 
shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equi-
ty for the ramification of any contract.” Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2). Walia is a citizen of Canada 
and the CPA firm a citizen of the United States which creates, according to the Fourth Cir-
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and the question of manifest disregard of the law, the court first reviewed 
the grounds for vacatur set forth in 9 U.S.C. § 10(a).146 The court then noted 
that the permissible common law grounds for vacating such an award “in-
clude those circumstances where an award fails to draw its essence from the 
contract, or the award evidences a manifest disregard of the law.”147 In a 
footnote, the court pointed out that the decision in Hall Street has caused the 
Fourth Circuit to recognize considerable uncertainty as to the validity of 
extra-statutory grounds for vacatur. 
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Hall Street Assocs., LLC 
v. Mattel, Inc. this court has recognized that considerable uncertainty ex-
ists “as to the continuing viability of the extra-statutory grounds for va-
cating arbitration awards.” Nevertheless, we have recognized that “mani-
fest disregard continues to exist” as a basis for vacating an arbitration 
award, either as an independent ground for review or as a “judicial 
gloss” on the enumerated grounds for vacatur set forth in the FAA.
148
 
In a case before the Seventh Circuit, Renard v. Ameriprise Financial 
Services, Inc., Renard sought vacatur, contending Ameriprise had 
fraudulently obtained the arbitral award, and the arbitrators had manifestly 
disregarded the law.149 It considered the question of whether manifest disre-
gard survived Hall Street as a ground for vacatur of an arbitral award and 
affirmed the award in its entirety.150 
The court began with a discussion of the limited nature of a review of 
arbitral awards, “[a]rbitrators do not act as junior varsity trial courts where 
subsequent appellate review is readily available to the losing party.”151 Arbi-
tration awards are subject to vacatur: “[O]nly if one of the criteria specified 
in 9 U.S.C. § 10 is present—as relevant here, only if ‘the arbitrator deliber-
 
cuit, a transaction involving foreign commerce, and, therefore, it falls within the jurisdictional 
provisions of the FAA. Id. at 244–45. 
 146. Id. at 245. 
 147. Id. at 245–46 (quoting MCI Constructors, LLC v. City of Greensboro, 610 F.3d 849, 
857 (4th Cir. 2010)). 
 148. Dewan, 544 F. App’x at 240 n.5 (citing Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 
U.S. 576 (2008)). 
 149. 778 F.3d 563, 566 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 150. Id. at 564–66. In this case, which involved a dispute between a securities brokerage 
firm and one of its financial advisors, the arbitration panel awarded money damages in favor 
of the brokerage firm, and the financial advisor sought vacatur of the award, contending, inter 
alia, that the arbitrators acted in manifest disregard of the law. Id. The award was confirmed 
by the district court and an appeal to the Seventh Circuit followed. Id. 
 151. Id. at 567 (citing Nat’l Wrecking Co. v. Local 731, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 990 F.2d 
957, 960 (7th Cir.1993)). The court also pointed out that under the FAA, even serious error in 
an arbitral decision does not subject it to vacatur. Id. (citing Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal-
Feeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 671(2010)). 
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ately disregards what he knows to be the law.’”152 The court limited the ap-
plicability of manifest disregard of the law to circumstances in which “the 
arbitrator directs the parties to violate the law.”153 Renard averred that the 
arbitrators had manifestly disregarded the law by misapplying Minnesota 
and Wisconsin law that the court concluded was far short of the standard for 
manifest disregard of the law.154 
The Seventh Circuit determined that the applicable law to be applied 
was the FAA with its tougher standard for manifest disregard of the law.155 
Turning to consideration of the efficacy of manifest disregard of the law as 
grounds for vacatur the court noted: 
An arbitral award cannot be vacated pursuant to the FAA merely because 
the petitioner “show[s] that the panel committed an error—or even a se-
rious error. It may be set aside only if one of the criteria specified in 9 
U.S.C. § 10 is present—as relevant here, only if “the arbitrator deliber-
ately disregards what he knows to be the law.”
156
 
Under this standard, the Seventh Circuit found that the arbitrators had 
not reached the benchmark for manifest disregard of the law.157 
Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Associates158 came before the Ninth 
Circuit by way of a declaratory judgment action with respect to a trademark 
license agreement by which Improv West granted Comedy Club rights in 
certain trademarks.159 Comedy Club appealed to the Ninth Circuit after “a 
complex procedural history” resulting in an arbitration award and an order 
by the district court confirming the award.160 The Ninth Circuit had previ-
ously determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review the order compelling 
arbitration entered by the district court.161 
Upon remand, the Comedy Club court concluded that Hall Street left its 
previous precedent intact. “[W]e conclude that Hall Street Associates did 
not undermine the manifest disregard of law ground for vacatur, as under-
 
 152. Renard, 778 F.3d at 567 (quoting Eljer Mfg., Inc. v. Kowin Dev. Corp., 14 F.3d 
1250, 1254 (7th Cir. 1993)). 
 153. Renard, 778 F.3d at 567 (quoting George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany and Co., 248 
F.3d 577, 579–81 (7th Cir. 2001)). 
 154. Renard, 778 F.3d at 569. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 567 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 671). 
 157. Renard, 778 F.3d at 569. 
 158. 553 F.3d 1277 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 159. Id. at 1280. 
 160. Id. at 1281. 
 161. Id. (citing Comedy Club, Inc. v Improv W. Assocs., 514 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
After the Supreme Court issued the Hall Street decision, it vacated the Ninth Circuit’s opin-
ion (Comedy Club) and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for further consideration in 
light of Hall Street. See Comedy Club Inc., 553 F.3d at 1281. 
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stood in this circuit to be a violation of § 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration 
Act, and that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law.”162 
In analyzing the effect of Hall Street on the continued viability of man-
ifest disregard, the court began its analysis with an examination of the ar-
gument of Improv West that manifest disregard is beyond the scope of the 
statutory reasons for vacatur and therefore invalid.163 The Ninth Circuit re-
jected this contention based on its holding in Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-
Bache Trade Services, Inc.164 In Kyocera, the Ninth Circuit held that it was 
within the power of the courts to vacate an arbitration award in circumstanc-
es in which the arbitrators exceeded their powers, which it defined to in-
clude when the award is completely irrational or exhibiting manifest disre-
gard of the law.165 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the issue—whether manifest disre-
gard falls within section 10 or 11 of the FAA—is beyond the scope of the 
decision reached in Hall Street.166 Rather, according to the Nine Circuit’s 
reading of Hall Street, the Supreme Court simply identified the several pos-
sible interpretations of the doctrine including that previously espoused by 
the Ninth Circuit.167 The “possible readings of the doctrine” included sec-
tions 10(a)(3) or 10(a)(4), those portions of the FAA dealing with vacatur on 
the grounds of misconduct or exceeding powers.168 Based on the discussion 
of the status of manifest disregard in Hall Street, the court concluded that 
Hall Street could not be said to be “‘clearly irreconcilable’ with Kyocera.”169 
As such, the court considered itself bound by prior Ninth Circuit precedent 
and, accordingly, held that manifest disregard remains a valid ground for 
vacatur as a part of section 10(a)(4).170 
Recently, in Wetzel’s Pretzels, LLC v. Johnson, the Ninth Circuit again 
had occasion to consider the status of manifest disregard post-Hall Street.171 
The Johnsons appealed a district court order denying vacatur of an arbitra-
 
 162. Comedy Club Inc., 553 F.3d at 1283. 
 163. Id. at 1289–90. 
 164. Id. at 1290 (quoting Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 
987, 997 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 165. Kyocera Corp., 341 F.3d at 997. 
 166. Comedy Club Inc., 553 F.3d at 1290. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 1290. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. The Ninth Circuit noted that this conclusion is in accord with the interpretation 
given to Hall Street by the Second Circuit. Id. (citing Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l 
Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010)). 
 171. Wetzel’s Pretzels, LLC v. Johnson, 567 F. App’x 493, 494 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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tion award in favor of Wetzel because the arbitrator exceeded his powers.172 
Framing the issue as whether the arbitrator exceeded his powers under sec-
tion 10(a)(4) of the FAA—the court held that the Johnsons had not shown 
the arbitrator exceeded his powers and denied the request for vacatur.173 The 
standard applied to finding facts sufficient to justify vacatur of the award 
was the following: “In order for us to vacate the award on the ground that 
the arbitrator exceeded his powers under § 10(a)(4), the Johnsons would 
have to show that the award was ‘completely irrational, or exhibit[ed] a 
manifest disregard of the law,’ but they have made no such showing.”174 
Although the court recognized the viability of manifest disregard of the law, 
it concluded that the Johnsons failed to establish manifest disregard, defined 
as a circumstance in which the arbitrator recognized the applicable law and 
then ignored it.175 
In Adviser Dealer Services, Inc. v. Icon Advisers, Inc., the Tenth Cir-
cuit also acknowledged the continued viability of manifest disregard of the 
law: 
A District Court may vacate an arbitration award only “for the reasons 
enumerated in the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10, or for ‘a hand-
ful of judicially creative reasons.’” These judicially creative reasons “in-
clude violations of public policy, manifest disregard of the law, and de-
nial of a fundamentally fair hearing.”
176
 
An arbitral panel constituted under the Financial Industry Regulatory Au-
thority (FINRA) found Adviser Dealer Services and its co-defendants jointly 
and severally liable to Icon for damages and attorney’s fees under a retire-
ment agreement.177 The district court vacated the attorney’s fee award. Icon 
appealed the vacatur of the attorney’s fee award and Adviser Dealer Ser-
vices cross-appealed the order upholding the damages award to Icon.178 The 
Tenth Circuit identified the grounds for vacatur of arbitral awards in the 
post-Hall Street era to include those set forth in the FAA, and “a handful of 
judicially created reasons” including “manifest disregard of the law.”179 
 
 172. Id. at 494. The arbitrator entered an award of enforcing post-termination provisions 
of a franchise agreement requiring that the Johnsons assign a lease in certain property inter-
ests to Wetzel’s Pretzels. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. (quoting Biller v. Toyota Motor Corp., 668 F.3d 655, 665 (9th Cir. 2012)). 
 175. Wetzel’s Pretzels, 567 F. App’x at 494 (quoting Biller, 668 F.3d at 656). 
 176. Adviser Dealer Servs., Inc. v. Icon Advisers, Inc., 557 F. App’x 714, 717 (10th Cir. 
2014) (citation omitted). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 718. 
 179. Id. at 717 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Okla., 
269F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 2001)); (quoting Sheldon v. Vermonty, 269 F.3d 1202, 1206 
(10th Cir. 2001)). See also Bangor Gas Co. v. H.Q. Energy 
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3. Circuits Undecided on Manifest Disregard 
The First, Third, and Sixth Circuits are outliers that have yet to defini-
tively answer the question of whether manifest disregard continues, after 
Hall Street, as an extra-statutory ground for vacatur. Post-Hall Street deci-
sions from these circuits are examined in this section. 
In Raymond James Financial Services, Inc. v. Fenyk, the First Circuit 
held that regardless of the legal status of manifest disregard as a basis for 
vacatur, the facts in the case did not establish manifest disregard of the 
law.180 Accordingly, the court found it unnecessary to make a definitive rul-
ing on the status of manifest disregard in the First Circuit: “We need not 
resolve the uncertainty over ‘manifest disregard’ . . . even assuming the 
doctrine remains available, it would not invalidate the award in this case.”181 
Nevertheless, the court addressed the viability of manifest disregard of the 
law as a ground for vacatur in some detail, without a conclusion one way or 
the other: 
Whether the manifest-disregard doctrine remains good law, however, is 
uncertain. A circuit split has developed following the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Hall Street Associates, L. L. C. v. Mattel, Inc., which held 
that § 10 of the FAA provides the exclusive grounds under the statute for 
vacatur of arbitration awards. Although we concluded, in dicta, that the 
doctrine is no longer available, we have “not squarely determined 




A Third Circuit case, Bellantuono v. ICAP USA, LLC, centered on the 
breach of an employment contract.183 The arbitration panel found for the 
employer, ICAP.184 Bellantuono appealed to the district court, unsuccessful-
ly arguing that the panel had manifestly disregarded the law by denying him 
certain discovery and refusing to issue sanctions as result of untimely pro-
duction of documents.185 Bellantuono again appealed, this time to the Third 
Circuit.186 That court affirmed the district court’s judgment on the grounds 
that Bellantuono had “failed to carry his substantial burden of showing a 
manifest disregard of the law or a failure to consider material evidence in 
the arbitration panel’s rulings.”187 
 
Services (U.S.) Inc., 695 F.3d 181, 187 n.3 (2012) (listing cases). 
 180. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Fenyk, 780 F.3d 59, 65 (1st Cir. 2015). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 64–65 (citation omitted). 
 183. Bellantuono v. ICAP USA, LLC, 557 F. App’x 168, 170 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 184. Id. at 172–73. 
 185. Id. at 173. 
 186. Id. at 170. 
 187. Id. 
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As for the grounds available to support vacatur of an arbitration award 
in the post-Hall Street era, the court held: 
The narrow circumstances under which a court may vacate an arbitration 
award are defined exclusively in Section 10 of the FAA. A court may 
vacate an arbitration award pursuant to Section 10 where: (1) the award 
was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) the arbitrators 
demonstrated partiality or corruption; (3) the arbitrators were guilty of 
misconduct; or (4) the arbitrators exceeded their powers.
188
 
The court noted that the legal basis for Bellantuono’s vacatur request 
was a manifest disregard of the law as opposed to any of the section 10 
grounds.189 The factual basis for the claim was that the panel had mishandled 
certain discovery related issues and in so doing had committed manifest 
disregard of the law.190 Even though it is not one of the grounds enumerated 
in section 10, the Third Circuit was among those recognizing manifest 
disregard as a basis for vacatur before the Hall Street decision.191 However, 
as the court pointed out, Hall Street declared that “the grounds for vacatur . . 
. provided by § . . . 10 . . . of the FAA are exclusive . . . [s]ince then, our 
sister Circuit Courts of Appeals are split on the question of whether manifest 
disregard of the law remains a viable ground for vacating an arbitration 
award.”192 In a footnote to this passage, the court noted: 
The Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have held that manifest disregard 
of the law survived Hall Street because an arbitrator exceeds his powers 
under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) by manifestly disregarding the law. Converse-
ly, the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that manifest disre-




The court identified the question to be answered as whether the arbitral 
panel in making its discovery rulings or in failing to grant a mistrial refused 
“to apply a plainly controlling rule of law.”194 The court acknowledged that 
the Third Circuit had not ruled on the viability of manifest disregard. 
However, becuase it agreed with the finding of the district court that the 
arbitral panel did not act in manifest disregard of the law the continuing 
 
 188. Id. at 173 (citing Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586–87 
(2008)). 
 189. Bellantuono, 557 F. App’x at 173. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. (citing Tanoma Min. Co., Inc. v. Local Union No. 1269, 896 F.2d 745, 749 (3d 
Cir. 1990)). 
 192. Bellantuono, 557 F. App’x at 173. 
 193. Id. (citations omitted). 
 194. Id. at 174. 
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validity of manifest disregard of the law is not outcome determinative in the 
case. Accordingly, it was not necessary for the court to make that 
determination in this case.195 
The Sixth Circuit addressed the manifest disregard conundrum in two 
cases, Coffee Beanery, LTD. v. WW, L.L.C.,196 and Schaefer v. Multiband.197 
Coffee Beanery, arose out of an agreement under which WW obtained a 
license to operate a cafe from Coffee Beanery.198 The parties ended up in a 
dispute over the license agreement of which they submitted to arbitration 
that resulted in an award in favor of Coffee Beanery on all claims.199 The 
district court denied WW’s motion to vacate and confirmed the award in its 
entirety.200 It also held, among other things, that WW did not establish that 
the arbitrator was guilty of manifest disregard of the law.201 
The Sixth Circuit acknowledged the following with respect to those 
statutory grounds: “This Court’s ability to vacate an arbitration award is 
almost exclusively limited to these grounds, although it may also vacate an 
award found to be in manifest disregard of the law.”202 In further reliance on 
Wilko as to what it is that constitutes manifest disregard: 
In Wilko, the Supreme Court implicitly recognized judicial review based 
on “manifest disregard” of the law when it stated that “the interpretations 
of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not 
subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpreta-
tion.” To constitute a manifest disregard for the law, “[a] mere error in 
interpretation or application of the law is insufficient. Rather, the deci-
sion must fly in the face of clearly established legal precedent.” Thus, an 
arbitrator acts with manifest disregard if “(1) the applicable legal princi-
ple is clearly defined and not subject to reasonable debate; and (2) the 
arbitrators refused to heed that legal principle.”
203
 
The Sixth Circuit conceded that the language in Hall Street “reduced 
the ability of federal courts” to vacate awards for non-statutory reasons, but 
it yielded not an inch to the argument that it foreclosed review for manifest 
 
 195. Id. 
 196. Coffee Beanery, LTD. v. WW, L.L.C., 300 F. App’x 415, 418–19 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 197. Schaefer v. Multiband 551 F. App’x 814, 818–19 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 198. Coffee Beanery, 300 F. App’x at 416. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 417. 
 201. Id. at 417–18. 
 202. Id. at 418 (emphasis added) (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953)). The 
section 10 grounds include: procurement of the award by corruption, fraud or undue means; 
arbitrator partiality or corruption; arbitrator misconduct; and arbitrator exceeded powers. Id. 
 203. Coffee Beanery, 300 F. App’x at 418 (citing Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436). 
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disregard of the law.204 In fact, it bolstered its argument with Justice Souter’s 
dictum in Hall Street.205 The Sixth Circuit recognized the decision in Hall 
Street as characterizing that holding as having reduced, but not foreclosing, 
federal courts’ ability to vacate arbitration awards on grounds other than 
those laid out in 9 U.S.C. § 10.206 However, after considering the issue of 
whether the arbitrator had manifestly disregarded the law, initiating the arbi-
tral award in the case, the court concluded that WW had failed to establish 
manifest disregard of the facts or the law on the part of the arbitrator.207 
In the other Sixth Circuit case, Schafer v. Multiband Corp., the court 
again left open the question of whether manifest disregard of the law 
remains a valid basis for vacatur.208 It concluded that even if manifest 
disregard is alive and well as a basis for vacatur, under the facts in this case, 
the arbitrator had committed an error of law, but he had not manifestly 
disregarded it.209 
Even so, the court took the opportunity to discuss Hall Street briefly 
noting that in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., decided two 
years after Hall Street, the Supreme Court left open the door for a later 
determination of the vitality of manifest disregard.210 “We do not decide 
whether ‘manifest disregard’ survives our decision in Hall Street as an 
independent ground for review or as a judicial gloss on the enumerated 
grounds for vacatur set forth in 9 U.S.C. § 10.”211 The Sixth Circuit asserted 
that it had “continued to acknowledge ‘manifest disregard’ as a ground for 
vacatur—albeit not in a published holding.”212 
IV. ACCURACY V. FINALITY: WHY NOT BOTH? 
The thrust of much of the jurisprudence surrounding arbitration agree-
ments and awards has been to mandate enforcement and suppress judicial 
review.213 Reducing the “risk” that awards will be vacated on appeal ad-
 
 204. Coffee Beanery, 300 F. App’x at 418 (citing Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 
552 U.S. 576, 585 (2008)). 
 205. Coffee Beanery, 300 F. App’x at 418 (citing Hall St., 552 U.S. at 585). 
 206. Coffee Beanery, 300 F. App’x at 419–20 (citing Hall St., 552 U.S. at 584). 
 207. Coffee Beanery, 300 F. App’x at 419–20. 
 208. Schafer v. Multiband Corp., 551 F. App’x 814 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 209. Id. at 818–20. 
 210. Id. at 821. 
 211. Id. at 821 n.1 (citing Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 543 F.3d 85, 
93–95 (2d Cir. 2008), overruled on other grounds, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l 
Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010)). 
 212. Schafer, 551 F. App’x at 821 n.1. 
 213. See e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U. S. 593, 
599 (1960) (opining that “this plenary review by a court of the merits would make meaning-
less the provisions that the arbitrator’s decision is final, for in reality it would almost never be 
final”); DueFerco Int’l Steel Trading v. T. Klaveness Shipping A/S, 333 F.3d 383, 389 (2d 
102 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
vances two of the primary goals of arbitration, efficiency, and finality.214 
Despite its many perceived advantages, and perhaps because of some of 
them, including finality and expediency, arbitration now comes with the 
potential for a significant offsetting risk that the arbitrator grievously fails to 
apply the law appropriately, with no available remedy. The choice faced by 
many potential beneficiaries of the arbitral process, including businesses 
involved in high-stakes disputes, is to forgo arbitration’s many advantages 
rather than accept the risk of harm resulting from a serious misapplication of 
the law in the face of no possible redress for even the most grievous 
misapplication of the law.215 
An article published by the author just after the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Hall Street raised the question of how the decision would affect the 
course of arbitration going forward.216 Questions surrounding such issues 
include the willingness of arbitral parties to exchange “reliable decision 
making and legal certainty for simplicity, speed, and economy” in the ab-
sence of meaningful judicial review.217 Another previously raised question 
was one directly on point here, the secondary effects on the practice of arbi-
tration given the uncertain status of the common law grounds for vacatur 
including manifest disregard of the law.218 Regrettably, that question re-
mains unanswered, seemingly caught in the effects of the serious circuit 
split that has continued since the Hall Street decision was issued in 2008. 
As exemplified by the majority opinion in Hall Street and the other 
cases discussed in this article, obtaining judicial review of an arbitration 
decision can be perceived as an uphill climb without much, if any, certainty. 
 
Cir. 2003) (quoting Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344, 349 (1854)) (asserting that to 
interfere with this process would frustrate the intent of the parties, and to work the usefulness 
of arbitration, making it the commencement, not the end, of litigation.); see also Note, Judi-
cial Review of Arbitration Awards on the Merits, 63 HARV. L. REV. 681, 681–82 (1950). 
 214. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933–34 (2d 
Cir. 1986). “A less strict standard of judicial review would be to undermine our well estab-
lished deference to arbitration as a favored method of settling disputes when agreed to by the 
parties.” Id. 
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A participant in the process could easily come away with the impression that 
no matter what the arbitrator decides, the chance of any meaningful judicial 
review to redress a manifest disregard of the law is remote. 
Precluding judicial review in all but the most unusual circumstances 
advances two of the goals of arbitration, efficiency and finality. Despite its 
many perceived advantages, and perhaps because of some of them, includ-
ing finality and expediency, arbitration now comes with an offsetting risk; 
that the arbitrator knowingly fails to apply the law appropriately, and there 
is no available remedy. As such, the choice faced by many potential benefi-
ciaries of the arbitral process, including businesses involved in high-stakes 
disputes, is to forgo arbitration’s many advantages rather than accept the 
risk of harm resulting from a serious misapplication of the law without the 
possibility of redress.219 In his brief essay, Timothy M. O’Shea succinctly 
captures the uncertainty that participants and potential participants in arbi-
tration face regarding the availability judicial review of arbitral decisions in 
the wake of Hall Street: 
What does all this mean for someone considering an arbitration agree-
ment? It means that it may be a good time to reevaluate whether arbitra-
tion would be appropriate for disputes that could arise in the future. The 
fact that there is no viable appeal mechanism at least in some 
jurisdictions-even if an arbitrator manifestly disregards the applicable 
law should serve as a strong warning to those who are thinking about 
adding an arbitration clause to their contracts. 
If the potential disputes involve substantial rights or sums of money, 
then arbitration may not be the best forum to resolve such disputes. Yet, 
it is also important to recognize that arbitration is not designed to be a 
perfect dispute resolution forum. Rather, it is designed primarily to avoid 
the time-consuming and costly alternative of litigation. The Supreme 
Court made it clear in Hall Street that a restrictive standard of review is 
necessary to preserve these benefits so that arbitration does not become a 
mere dress rehearsal for litigation. Nevertheless, the developing split of 
authority among the courts on this issue makes it likely that the Supreme 
Court will be asked once again to address whether an arbitrator can 
really disregard the law.
220
 
Without question, many factors play into the decision to submit a dis-
pute to arbitration. The potential benefits of arbitration are well known. 
However, to take advantage of these benefits, should the participant be re-
quired to forfeit any meaningful judicial review of an arbitral decision re-
 
 219. See generally Biesterfeld, supra note 215, at 627; Bolt, supra note 215, at 162 (cit-
ing Rovina, supra note 215, at 168); Kessler, supra note 215, at 92. 
 220. Timothy M. O’Shea, Arbitration’s Appeal: The Grounds Have Narrowed, 66-JUL 
BENCH & B. MINN. 31 (2009). 
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sulting from a knowing misapplication of the law? Particularly in arbitra-
tions with a great deal at issue, parties should not be precluded in that way 
from taking advantage of the arbitration process in preference to litigation. 
Some solutions have been suggested, including an amendment to the FAA 
to permit such limited judicial review.221 But one thing seems certain; there 
is little expectation that relief will come soon in the form of a resolution by 
the Supreme Court of the manifest disregard circuit split. 
 
 221. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Revising the FAA to Permit Expanded Judicial Review of 
Arbitration Awards, 8 NEV. L. J. 214 (2008); Christopher R. Drahozal, Codifying Manifest 
Disregard, 8 NEV. L. J. 234 (2008). See also Stephen L. Hayford, Reining in the “Manifest 
Disregard” of the Law Standard: The Key to Restoring Order to the Law of Vacatur, 1998 J. 
DISP. RESOL. 117 (1998). 
